1973 Arab Israeli War: A History

By NDNG_Dane

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War, also known as the Yom Kippur War in Israel, and the Ramadan War in Arab countries, is the fourth war between the Arabs and the Israelis. The first being the 1948–49 Arab-Israeli War, second being the 1956 Suez War, and third being the 1967 six-day war. On October 6, 1973, Egyptian and Syrian forces launched a coordinated attack against Israel on Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar.

Background
In 1967, Arab forces, greatly outnumbering Israeli forces, suffered a humiliating defeat with Israel’s stunning six-day victory. In the wake of that war, it was clear that the Arabs could not regain their lost territory by directly attacking Israel head-on. Egypt’s President Nasser, developed a strategy to attack Israel by attrition, with minimal military engagements. President Nasser’s “War of Attrition” started in March 1969 and consisted of artillery bombardments and commando raids designed to impose “unacceptable casualties” on Israel.

The fundamental weakness of the “attrition” strategy was Israel’s ability to escalate the conflict when costs grew unacceptable and in fact, make the Egyptian costs too great to bear. One example of this occurred in January 1970, in an effort to force an end to Egypt’s “War of Attrition”, Israel conducted precision air strikes against strategic Egyptian targets.

Shocked by the severity of the Israeli bombing raid, President Nasser flew to Moscow and convinced the Soviet government to supply Egypt with new Surface-to-Air Missiles, known as SAM-3s and additional Soviet fighter aircraft (with Soviet pilots to fly them). There was a direct Soviet-Israeli air battle on 30 July 1970, resulting in five Soviet aircraft downed with no Israeli losses. Shortly after, with pressure from the Soviet Union, Egypt agreed to a cease-fire with Israel and the “War of Attrition” ended in August 1970.

In September 1970, President Nasser died of a heart attack and was succeeded by Anwar Sadat. President Sadat exhibited greater flexibility than Nasser in pursuing diplomatic solutions. President Sadat proclaimed 1971 the “year of decision” if diplomacy failed to dislodge the Israelis from the Sinai, President Sadat would use military force. 1971 passed with the Israelis still occupying the Sanai, and no Egyptian action. President Sadat’s proclamation was seen as “hollow words” and he was losing prestige in the Arab World.

In July 1972, President Sadat expelled over 20,000 Soviet advisers from Egypt. In the Arab World, Egypt lost even more prestige. What Egypt’s fellow Arabs did not realize, is that by getting out from under the Soviets, it actually provided Sadat more freedom of action. Interestingly, despite the expulsion of Soviet advisors and military trainers, President Sadat was able to obtain a massive military arms sale of Soviet military equipment for delivery in early 1973.

On the Yom Kippur of October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated surprise attack on Israel. The Yom Kippur War was launched on the holiest day on the Jewish calendar: The Day of Atonement. Using innovative tactics and advanced technology, Israeli forces achieved a remarkable military recovery–Israeli troops broke the Arab advance and encircled Egyptian forces in Sinai. Pictured here are the Israeli tanks which crossed into the Suez Canal’s western border and reached within 101 kilometers of Cairo, Egypt. Photo: IDF photo archives.

Israel
From Israel’s perspective, “status quo” was a favorable outcome to war. The 1967 war gave Israel reasonably defensible borders and some strategic depth for the first time in the nation’s history. It would be a long time before the defeated Arabs could challenge Israel’s military prowess. The apparent cooling of Egyptian-Soviet relations was also a favorable development. Moreover, the pursuit of détente by the superpowers favored continuation of the current “status quo”. The environment seemed to provide Israel with a greater range of choices for a National Security Strategy.

Israel’s National Security Strategy was “total deterrence” by threatening massive retaliation strikes for any attack. Operationally the strategy relied on three elements:
• Prepared defensive strong points along the hostile borders, which would enable Israel’s small standing ground force (supported by a qualitatively superior Air Force) to blunt any initial assault.
• Rapid mobilization of well-trained reserve ground forces to execute a counter-attack to regain any lost ground (Israel’s ground forces would grow to more than 350,000 upon full mobilization).
• Sufficient strategic warning (minimum 24 to 48 hours) to both properly deploy regular forces into the border defenses and mobilize the reserves.

The Concept
In October 1973, all three elements of the Israeli strategy failed to some extent. The most critical failure being a lack of strategic warning. The Israeli surprise was due in large part to their “concept of Arab operations” in that, 1) Any future Egyptian attack would only come after Israeli air superiority was defeated, and 2) Syria would not attack on its own, without Egypt. This “concept” was not just an Israeli assumption, it was a direct quote from Egypt’s strategic assessment document.

By October 1973 the “concept” was still valid. Through a series of intelligence and reconnaissance reports, Israel knew that Syria was massing forces along its border. But there has been no massive buildup of Egyptian Air Forces nor any technically overmatching new Aircraft. Therefore, Israel still believed that Egypt would not go to war while still inferior in the air. The Israelis did know that Syria was preparing for some sort of military action, but what the Israelis didn’t know is that the Arabs had solved the “air superiority problem.” Not with new long-range aircraft to attack Israeli air-fields, but by acquiring SAMs, which provided a nearly impenetrable air defense umbrella.

Preparing for the next war
Israel’s 1967 pre-emptive strike cost her diplomatically among its allies. It also forced some military changes on how it would conduct the upcoming Yom Kippur War. For example, the French condemned Israel for starting the War and put an embargo on Military Equipment being shipped to Israel. President de Gaulle stopped the shipment of 50 Mirage fighter aircraft to the IAF, even though Israel had paid for them in advance. The French embargo also included spare parts for existing IAF aircraft. This hurt the IAF because the majority of its current aircraft were French.

Despite diplomatic and material losses, Israeli Military readiness continued after the 1967 war. By the early 1970s, Israel had upgraded much of its military equipment. The IAF greatly increased their capabilities with the addition of US fighter aircraft. The changeover from French to U.S. aircraft was a quantum capability leap for the IAF. The IAF pilots and ground crews found the American aircraft simpler to work on and repair, yet more sophisticated more reliable in the air. The F-4 Phantom was a multi-role -fighter with a speed of Mach-2 and a 1,000-mile combat radius. Though the IAF only had 70 F-4s, they performed nearly 50% of all Close Air Support (CAS) missions as well as more than 50% of all air-to-air combat missions. Similarly, the A-4 Skyhawk became the premier ground attack aircraft in the IAF. The A-4 was extremely maneuverable and was preferred by the IAF pilots.

For the IDF ground forces, new US M60 tanks were acquired for IDF Armored formations. IDF artillery was also upgraded with newer pieces which increased their range and mobility. Though many of the IDF infantry units were given US M113 APCs, Much of the IDF still traveled in WWII half-tracks and Jeeps.

Indications and Warnings
On 13 September 1973, Syrian Air forces attacked an Israeli reconnaissance flight over the Mediterranean Sea. Israeli F-4 Fighters intercepted the Syrian MIGs. The result was a loss of 1 Israeli F-4 and 13 Syrian MIGs. This engagement lead to subsequent Arab ground force deployments close to the border. Israeli military intelligence expected some sort of retaliation for the incident, and in this light, Syrian deployments could be seen as either preparation for a limited retaliatory strike.

On 25 September, King Hussein of Jordan requested an urgent meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. King Hussein flew his personal helicopter to Israel and delivered warnings that Syria intends to invade Israel in person. Prime Minister Meir asked her Director of Military Intelligence, for an assessment of King Hussein’s warning. As a precautionary measure, Prime Minister Meir directed the two Brigades in the Golan Heights to increase their readiness levels.

Crossing the Suez
On 6 October 1973, the Egyptians had prepared for an assault across the canal with five divisions totaling over 100,000 soldiers, 1,350 tanks and 2,000 pieces of Artillery. Facing the Egyptians the East Bank on the Bar-Lev Line, a 60 ft high sand barrier, were 450 soldiers of the Jerusalem Brigade, spread out among 16 forts. There were 290 Israeli tanks in all of the Sinai, divided into three Armored Brigades. Only one of these was deployed near the Canal when hostilities commenced.

The Egyptian plan called for a broad front attack across the Canal in order to deny the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) the ability to mass their forces at any one critical area. An attack on a narrow front would have given Israel an ideal target for IAF air strikes while the Egyptians marshaled their forces prior to and during the Canal crossings. Another reason for attacking a wide front was the placement of Egyptian forces already defending along the Canal. If the IDF counterattacked along the wide front, the Egyptian SAMs would be more effective against a lesser density of aircraft. If the IAF tried to interdict only one or two bridges, the Egyptian forces would still have many more bridges available.

The plan called for a five infantry division attack, each reinforced by an armored brigade. The divisions were to attack in five major sectors, each using numerous crossing sites, to establish bridgeheads on the East Bank, about three miles wide per division. The objectives were to penetrate the Bar Lev Line and establish a defensive line deep in the Sinai, under the protection of the SAM umbrella and defeat any Israeli counterattacks. The SAMs would, for the most part, stay on the West Bank, out of artillery range. Once dug in to fortified positions in the Sinai, the Egyptians felt they could defeat any IDF armor formations as long as the IAF could not support. The Egyptians believed they could inflict heavy losses on the IDF, and exploit Israeli’s limited manpower and its sensitivity to casualties.

The IDF calculated it would take the Egyptians at least 24 hours to blast breaches in the 60 ft high sand walls using explosives. The Egyptians sliced their way through using high-pressure water cannons in less than five. Simultaneously, Egyptian engineer units assembled pontoon bridges to transport heavy equipment across the canal, while commandos equipped with new Soviet anti-tank wire guided missiles moved deep into the Sinai to blunt any Israeli armored counterattack.

Egyptian military trucks cross a bridge laid over the Suez Canal on October 7, 1973, during the Yom Kippur War/October War

Many of these breach crossings were opened in the first two hours, beating Israeli intelligence estimates for such a feat, by 22 hours. The first Egyptian armored forces through the breaches were the amphibious PT-76 tanks and BMPs. These were followed by Soviet engineer vehicles erecting pontoon bridges and motorized barges. This allowed the heavier Egyptian tanks, including modern T-62 tanks, to cross quickly. By 7 October, Egypt had over 1,000 tanks and 100,000 troops on the East Bank.

The multi-pronged offensive purposely had no main attack against which, Israel could concentrate its counter-attack. Instead, the Egyptians pushed into the desert on a broad front. Israeli armored units, rushing to help the besieged strongpoints, were met by a fusillade of Sagger missiles and RPG’s. With no reconnaissance and unsupported by infantry, the Israeli tanks were routed. By the morning of 7 October, more than half of the 290 Israeli tanks in the Sinai had been destroyed. The Egyptians consolidated their gains behind their infantry shield, while remaining under their SAM umbrella. The few remaining Bar-Lev line forts came under intense attack and were eventually captured.

Egyptian T62 – (photo credit Egyptain archives)

Attack in the Golan Heights
On 6 October, 100 Syrian MiGs began dropping bombs in the Golan Heights as five Syrian Divisions comprised of 1,400 tanks and supported by 1,000 Artillery pieces, attacked the two Israeli Brigades positioned there. The forward brigades of the Syrian divisions were accompanied by mobile anti-aircraft batteries, engineering bulldozers to fill-in anti-tank ditches, bridge-layers to overcome anti-tank ditches and mine-clearance vehicles to breach any minefields. The engineering vehicles were priority targets for Israeli gunners and took heavy losses. Syrian infantrymen, braving intense fire, continued to advance and used shovels to fill-in the anti-tank ditches enabling Syrian tank crossing points.

At the onset of the battle, the two Israeli brigades were comprised of 180 tanks, 60 artillery pieces and approximately 3,000 soldiers. Every Israeli tank deployed on the Golan Heights was engaged during the initial attack. Syrian commandos dropped behind the Israeli positions by helicopter and captured the Israeli stronghold at Mount Hermon, which was a critical intelligence and surveillance station as well as communications hub. An Israeli force attempting to regain Mount Hermon was repulsed by the Syrian commandos and heavy RPG fires.

The Golan Heights front was given priority for IAF CAS by the Israeli High Command because of its proximity to major Israeli cities such as Tiberius, Safed, Haifa and Netanya. If the Syrians had regained the Golan Heights, it would pose a serious threat to thousands of Israeli men, women and children.

On 7 October, the IAF attempted to take out the Syrian anti-aircraft batteries with minimal success. On the ground, however, Syrian forces suffered heavy losses as Israeli tanks and infantry who were fighting desperately to allow time for reserve forces to reach the front lines. During the night, the Syrians, equipped with night-vision optics, fired with precision. The Israelis had to allow the Syrians to advance to ranges close enough to observe the muzzle flash and then return fire. Israeli forces were successful in holding back numerous Syrian attacks.

An Israeli tank unit crosses the Sinai, heading for the Suez Canal. (Israeli Government Press Office)

By the afternoon of 9 October, only six, of the 7th Armored Brigade’s tanks, remained in action. Running critically low on ammunition, the remnants of the brigade were planning to pull back. Moments before the Brigade was about to pull out of their battle positions, radio communications were received, announcing that a relief column had arrived. The relief “column” was actually a force of 15 tanks which had been recently repaired and were crewed by injured men from the aid station who volunteered. The arrival of “fresh” tanks and increased fire had alarmed the Syrians, who themselves were exhausted by three days of continuous fighting, believed that the Israeli reserves were now arriving, the numerically superior Syrian forces began to retreat.

Also on 9 October, Syrian FROG-7 surface-to-surface missiles struck an IAF base at Ramat, killing a pilot and injuring numerous airmen. Additional missiles struck civilian settlements in the area. In retaliation, seven IAF F-4 Phantoms flew into Syria and struck the Syrian General Staff HQ in Damascus. The IAF F-4 Phantoms struck from Lebanese airspace to avoid the heavily AA emplacements around the Golan Heights. The Syrian Air Force Command HQ was also badly damaged. The strike prompted the Syrian High Command to transfer air defense units from the Golan Heights to the home front, allowing the IAF greater freedom of action over the Golan Heights.

By 10 October, the last Syrian unit in the central sector was pushed back across the pre-war ceasefire line. After four days of intense combat, the Israelis had succeeded in ejecting the Syrians from the entire Golan.

Israel counterattacks
The Egyptian attack into the Sinai stopped at the edge of their protective AA umbrella and at the effective range of their artillery coverage. Most of the Egyptian Artillery stayed on the west bank of the canal. By halting their attack, The Egyptians ceded the Israelis with time to recover and reorganize. The Israelis used this time wisely and planned their counterattack.

 

On the Yom Kippur of October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated surprise attack on Israel. The Yom Kippur War was launched on the holiest day on the Jewish calendar: The Day of Atonement. Egypt attacked Israel on its southern front. Pictured here are Israeli troops who fought off Egyptian soldiers in the Sinai desert.
Photo: IDF photo archives.

 

On 14 October, the Israelis attacked the Egyptians with three Armored Divisions by exploiting a gap between the Egyptian Second and Third Armies. The Israeli Armored Divisions penetrated deep into Egyptian battlespace with a goal to establish a bridgehead across the canal. On the night of 15 October, 750 Israeli paratroopers crossed the canal in rubber boats to secure the west bank. Israeli Engineers built motorized rafts and began to ferry tanks across the canal. The Armored force encountered very little resistance and fanned out North, South and West, attacking supply convoys, SAM sites, and logistic centers. Priority targets were the SAM sites. Israeli tanks and infantry didn’t need to destroy every vehicle and piece of equipment at the SAM sites, instead they simply shot holes in the Egyptian Radar Screens and rendered the system blind, and useless.

With a large amount of Egyptian SAMs now blind and useless, the Syrians no longer posed a credible AA threat and the Israelis were able to shift additional air power to the Sinai in support of the ground offensive. The combination of a much weakened Egyptian SAM umbrella and a greater concentration of Israeli fighter-bombers meant that the IAF was capable of greatly increasing CAS sorties against Egyptian military targets, including armor and airfields.
The IAF began attacking the remaining Egyptian SAM sites. This prompted Egyptian GHQ to order the withdrawal of most of the air defense equipment. This had two effects, both favorable to the Israelis. First, with the withdrawal of the Egyptian AA umbrella, the Egyptian forces in the Sinai were now vulnerable to the IAF. Second, the withdrawal of Egyptian AA also gave the IAF greater freedom to operate in Egyptian airspace.

Securing the East Bank
On 16 October, the IDF attacked entrenched Egyptian forces overlooking the roads leading to the canal. After three days of bitter and close-quarters fighting, the Israelis succeeded in dislodging the numerically superior Egyptian force. The Israelis lost about 300 dead, 1,000 wounded, and 56 tanks. The Egyptians suffered heavier casualties, including 118 tanks destroyed and 15 captured.

The Egyptians had not yet grasped the significance of the Israeli Divisions on the West Bank of the canal. Though Egyptian GHQ was not happy about IDF being on Egyptian soil, they maintained it was merely a diversion for a major IDF offensive targeting the Egyptian Second Army, still on the East Bank. Egyptian GHQ ordered the 21st Armored Division to attack southward supported by the 25th Independent Armored Brigade, equipped with new T-62 tanks, to attack northward to in a pincer action to eliminate the “one” IDF Armored Division threat to the Second Army.

The Egyptians failed to conduct reconnaissance and were unaware that a second IDF Armored Division, the 162nd, was also present in that area. Further, the Egyptian 21st Armored Division and 25th Independent Armored Brigade failed to coordinate their attacks, allowing the IDF, 162nd Division to meet each Egyptian force individually. Gen Adan first concentrated his attack on the 21st Armored Division, destroying 50–60 Egyptian tanks and forcing the remainder to retreat. Gen Adan then turned southward and engaged the 25th Independent Armored Brigade, destroying 86 of its 96 tanks and all of its APCs while losing only three tanks of his own.

 

Gen Adan’s Division and Gen Magen’s Division both moved south, decisively defeating the Egyptians in a series of engagements, both sides suffered heavy casualties. Gen Adan’s Division advanced towards the Sweetwater Canal area where many SAM sites were located. Gen Adan’s three armored brigades fanned out, with one advancing through the Geneifa Hills, a second along a parallel road to the south, and the third advancing towards Mina.

 

The Israelis slowly advanced, bypassing Egyptian positions whenever possible. In one engagement, a company of tanks fired on and destroyed several SAM sites from a distance of four km. This enabled the IAF to provide CAS for the IDF attack of an Egyptian armored unit at Mitzeneft. Additionally one of the IDF Brigades also captured the Fayid Airport, which was subsequently repaired by Israeli Engineers and used to fly in food, water, ammunition, and supplies as well as fly out wounded IDF soldiers.

Isolating the Egyptian Third Army
The IDF combat action over the past three days had largely destroyed the Egyptian Second Army. The IDF expansion on the West Bank and control of all bridges back into Egypt also encircled the Egyptian Third Army. The significance of the Israeli force on the West Bank was now clear. Despite being surrounded, the Egyptian Third Army managed to maintain its combat integrity east of the canal and keep up its defensive positions, though they were running low on water, food, fuel and all matters of supply.

The encirclement the Egyptian Third Army was flashed out on Newspaper Headlines around the world. This was again, a huge loss of prestige and cause for embarrassment to the Egyptians and the Arab World as a whole.

Fearful that the destruction of two well equipped (Soviet) Egyptian armies might draw the world into WWIII, the UN and specifically the United States exerted tremendous pressure on Israel to refrain from destroying the Egyptian Third Army. The UN called for a resolution demanding that the Israelis withdraw from Egypt and the Sinai if Israel did not allow non-military supplies to reach the Egyptian Third Army.

The Soviets placed seven Airborne Divisions on alert and cargo aircraft were positioned to transport them to the Middle East. Additionally, several Soviet fighter air wings were placed on maximum alert status. The Soviets also deployed destroyers and the minesweeper Rulevoi in the Mediterranean Sea along with seven amphibious ships with 4,000 naval infantry embarked.

On the Yom Kippur of October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated surprise attack on Israel. The Yom Kippur War was launched on the holiest day on the Jewish calendar: The Day of Atonement. Israeli forces succeeded in halting most of Syrian and Egypt forces. Pictured here is a Syrian tank that was blocked from attacking an IDF post. Photo: IDF photo archives.

Untangling
On 28 October 1973, disengagement talks took place between Israeli Major General Aharon Yariv and Egyptian Major General Abdel Ghani el-Gamasy. United Nations forces were brought in to establish checkpoints allowing nonmilitary supplies to pass to the Egyptian Third Army and prisoners-of-war were exchanged. A Peace summit was held in Geneva in December 1973.

The result of the conference was a UN Security Council Resolution #338 which called for a “just and durable peace”. The Conference was only marginally successful as Syria refused to attend.
On 18 January 1974, Israel and Egypt signed a “disengagement agreement” under its terms, Israel agreed to pull back its forces from the areas West of Suez Canal, which it had occupied since the end of hostilities. Moreover, Israeli forces were to also pull back on the whole front to create a UN security zone. Thus, Israel gave up its advances on the west bank of the Suez Canal, but it still held nearly all of Sinai.

On 31 May 1974, based on an exchange of prisoners-of-war, Israel agreed to withdraw to the pre-war ceasefire line and the establishment of a UN security zone was emplaced. The UN Disengagement and Observer Force (UNDOF) was established as a peacekeeping force in the Golan Heights.

Epilogue
Though the war reinforced Israel’s military might as a deterrence to Arab World, it had a demoralizing effect on the population of Israel. The shock and near catastrophe that occurred at the beginning of the war inflicted a terrible psychological blow to the Israelis. In fact, Israelis launched numerous protests against the Israeli government for not being better prepared. Shimon Agranat, President of the Israeli Supreme Court, was asked to lead an inquiry, the Agranat Commission, into the events leading up to the war and the setbacks of the first few days. The Agranat Commission published a report stating that “Six people were particularly responsible for Israel’s failings”:

• Though his performance and conduct during the war were lauded, the IDF Chief of Staff, David Elazar, was recommended for dismissal. The report concluded that he bore “personal responsibility for the assessment of the situation and the preparedness of the IDF”.
• Military Research Department Chief, Aluf Eli Zeira, and his deputy, BG Aryeh Shalev, were both recommended for dismissal.
• Lt. Colonel Bandman, chief of the intelligence for Egypt, and Lt. Colonel Gedelia, chief of intelligence for the Southern Command, were both recommended for transfer away from intelligence duties.
• Gen Samuel Gonen, commander of the Southern front, was recommended to be relieved of active duty as “he failed to fulfill his duties adequately, and bears much of the responsibility for the dangerous situation in which our troops were caught.”

On the Yom Kippur of October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated surprise attack on Israel. The Yom Kippur War was launched on the holiest day on the Jewish calendar: The Day of Atonement. Pictured here is a scene from a major battle where Israeli troops fought off Syrian soldiers in the Golan Heights, the area was later named the Valley of Tears. Photo: IDF photo archives.

Although The Agranat Commission had absolved PM Golda Meir and Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan of all responsibility, public calls for their resignations remained on the front pages of newspapers. Subsequently, on 11 April 1974, Golda Meir resigned.

PostScript
In response to U.S. support of Israel, the Arab members of OPEC, led by Saudi Arabia, decided to reduce oil production by 5% per month on 17 October. On 19 October, President Nixon authorized a major allocation of arms supplies and $2.2 billion in appropriations for Israel. In response, Saudi Arabia declared an embargo against the United States, later joined by other Arab oil exporters causing the 1973 energy crisis