1967 Arab Israeli War: A Short History

by NDNG_Dane

The 1967 Arab-Israeli War is the third war between the Arabs and the Israelis. The first being the 1948–49 Arab-Israeli War and the second being the 1956 Suez War. When reading historical accounts of the 1967 war, there is often national bias on the part of the author. For example, the Israelis claim they were provoked by an imminent Arab attack. The Arabs claim they were reacting to Israeli aggression toward Syria.

Background
Ever since the start of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, Israel had existed in a continued state of war with all of its Arab neighbors, including Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The first two wars were ended with cease-fires, but not with lasting peace. Thus, when the military forces of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, began to mobilize and make obvious preparations for war, Israel felt forced to act, in self-defense.

In the 1956 Arab-Israeli war, Israeli forces defeated the Egyptian military and occupied the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip, only to give it back to Egypt in the cease-fire agreement. In the subsequent years, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq became aligned with the Soviet Union, which supplied them with large amounts of modern military weaponry and Soviet advisors and trainers.

Gamal Abdel Nasser with pilots at a Sinai airbase along the border with Israel prior to the Six Day War in June 1967 – WikiCommons

Obversly, Israel moved closer to the United States. The Eisenhower administration would not allow the U.S. to get entwined in a Middle East regional conflict, but seeing first-hand what happened to the Jewish people during WWII, did provide Israel with some funding and surplus military equipment. The Arab-Israeli conflict became a proxy war as part of the larger Cold War between the U.S. and its allies on one side, and the Soviets and their allies on the other side.

Under Constant Attack

Just ten years after the 1956 Arab-Israeli war, violence in Israel was occurring almost daily. In the 18 months prior to June 1967, Palestinian Guerillas launched 120 cross-border attacks on Israel from both Syria and Jordan. Palestinian Guerillas planted landmines, bombed water pumps and engaged in regular highway ambushes. In November 1966, a landmine killed three Israeli paratroopers near the border town of Arad. Israel responded with an air strike on both Syria and Jordan. The attack resulted in the destruction of more than 100 houses, a school, a post office, a library and a medical clinic. 14 Jordanians died.

Setting the Stage

Israel, being a long, narrow country, with no natural borders (mountains, rivers, etc.), possessed no strategic depth. The Israelis could not trade land for time to prepare as the Soviets did during the summer of 1941 when the Germans invaded Russia.

Captured Armour from the 6-Day War. Photo shows: An anti aircraft Russian made cannon left by the Egyptian Army
1967/08/01 Copyright © IPPA 01738-000-42
Photo by [010] Hadani DanOn May 13, 1967, Soviet officials informed the Syrian and Egyptian Governments that Israel had massed troops on Syria’s border. Though the report was false, Egypt’s President Nasser sent large numbers of Egyptian soldiers into the Sinai anyway.

On May 22, 1967, Egypt blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba and continued to mass their forces in the Sinai.

On 28 May 28, 1967, President Nasser announced at a press conference that “we intend to open a general assault on Israel. This will be total war. Our basic aim is the destruction of Israel.”

Arabs

In Egypt, on July 23, 1952, Gamel Abdel Nasser, a military officer, led a coup that deposed King Farouk. The Nasser-led Revolutionary Command Council installed a new government. For the Arabs, Egypt was the linchpin to success in resolving the Israel problem. President Nasser believed he could consolidate the Arab World under his leadership. Egypt had a military plan to defeat Israel in the Sinai. They would absorb a first strike, then counterattack once Israel passed her culminating point. Further, Egypt would lead an Arab coalition Army on the Jordanian Front, in the hopes of driving a wedge through Israel’s narrow center. This two-part battle plan was known as OPERATION KAHIR.

Israel

Israel was working on a battle plan of their own. Outnumbered and surrounded, the Israelis knew they had to conduct a preemptive attack to gain the initiative. Israel would conduct both air and ground attacks, near-simultaneously.

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted preemptive air strikes on the Egyptian Air Force (EAF). Not only did the IAF destroy EAF aircraft in the air, but also on the ground. The IAF targeted and bombed all EAF runways to prevent the remaining EAF fighters from launching counter-strikes. This allowed the IAF greater freedom of action to support their ground forces, and also denied to the EAF the ability to support its own ground forces.

Maneuver
The few roads that traverse the Sinai represent the only way to move large numbers of mechanized forces. These roads, and more importantly, the major intersections, are the key controlling the peninsula. Egypt had invested heavily in massing defensive positions at several of these key locations such as the Rafah Junction and Abu Ageila.
Trusting to the advantage of the defense over the offense, the Egyptians felt that the Israelis would not succeed in breaking these defensive positions. Further, the Egyptians assumed that building several of these fortified positions would keep the Israelis from successfully attacking these critical intersections.

Following the high tention between Egypt and Israel, the IDF mobilized its army for any possibility.
Photo shows: an armour unit on alert in the Negev desert
1967/05/20 Copyright © IPPA 01669-000-43
Photo by [010] Hadani DanThat is contrary to what the Israelis actually did. Combined artillery barrages, Close air support and concentrated armor attacks enabled the Israelis to press the attack. By concentrating their forces in a few critical areas, rather than a broad front, the Israelis were able to outnumber Arab forces at these critical points. Israel’s success on the ground came as a great surprise to the Egyptians.

Not only did the Israeli ground forces not culminate in the kill zone, they continued to drive deeper into Egyptian battle-space, forcing a general withdrawal of the Egyptian ground forces.
There were some bright spots for the Egyptian Sinai Field Army. The 4th Egyptian Armored Division contained some of the best led and trained soldiers in-theater. Not only were they able to withdraw across the Suez intact, they also dealt out punishment to their Israeli pursuers while doing so. To accomplish this, they employed a screening force to allow their logistical units and main-body to cross the Suez virtually unscathed.

Jordan enters the war
The Jordanian Armed Forces were organized in three divisions. Total ground forces numbered approximately 45,000 soldiers, 300 tanks and 200 artillery pieces deployed in the West Bank. Jordanian mechanized forces possessed sizable numbers of M113 APCs and were equipped with modern Western tanks, 250 of which were U.S. M48 Pattons. The Jordanian ground forces also had six batteries of 81 mm and 120 mm mortars for infantry direct support. The Jordanian Army, then known as the Arab Legion, was a professional army, was well-equipped and well-trained. The small Royal Jordanian Air Force consisted of only 24 British-made Hawker Hunter fighters, six transports, and two helicopters.

Jordan’s unexpected entry into the war on 5 June caused some concern with respect to Israel’s allocation of forces. The effect on the Sinai Campaign was a reduced number of IAF support missions in the South. General Ariel Sharon’s mission to take Umm Katef in his drive to Abu Ageila was jeopardized when an air strike was canceled just minutes before its scheduled attack time. Those aircraft were redirected on the Jordanian Front.

Syria enters the war
False Egyptian reports of “a crushing victory” against the Israeli army and forecasts that Egyptian forces would soon be attacking Tel Aviv influenced Syria’s decision to attack. Syrian artillery began shelling northern Israel, and 12 Syrian jets attacked Israeli settlements in Galilee. Israeli fighters intercepted the Syrian aircraft, shooting down three and driving off the rest.

The Ground attack of a Syrian Armor Brigade captured the water plants at Tel Dan, Dan, and She’ar Yashuv. These attacks were driven back with the loss of seven Israeli tanks 20 Israeli soldiers. The Syrian offensive quickly stalled. Syrian reserve units were broken up by Israeli air attacks. Further, several tanks were reported to have sunk in the Jordan River.

Syria abandoned its ground attack and began a massive artillery bombardment of Israeli communities in the Hula Valley. Consequently, Israel conducted counter-battery Artillery fires on Syria’s fortified Golan Heights for two days. On June 9, launched a combined arms attack of Armor and Mechanized Infantry to seize the Golan Heights. After a day of fierce fighting, on June 10, the Syrians retreated from the Golan Heights.

Command
The Israelis built their military using the British model. All service commanders served in the General Headquarters (GHQ) under the Chief of Staff, Yitzhak Rabin. The three permanent district commanders – North, Central and South, were part of the GHQ as well. At the theater level, true unity of command did not exist, although unity of effort did. The commander of the Southern District was BG Yeshayahu Gavish, who had all IDF ground forces in-theater assigned to him. He had no direct control, however, of naval or air forces which belonged to their respective service chiefs, and ultimately to the Chief of Staff Rabin.

OPERATION KAHIR, the campaign plan for the Sinai, was devised in 1966 by the Egyptian General Staff. It was to be a defense-in-depth campaign, aimed at drawing the Israelis deep into the Sinai Peninsula. Once inside the Egyptian Kill-zone, defined as the area between Jebel Libni, Bir Gifgafa, and Suweitma, Egyptian forces would envelop the Israeli forces and then annihilate them.

The KAHIR plan was never “gamed” or “red-teamed” by the Egyptian military planners, nor, was it even disseminated to Division or subordinate commanders. Nevertheless, Egyptian forces were deployed in accordance with the KAHIR plan. Further, President Nasser was not initially briefed on OPERATION KAHIR. Subsequently, when President Nasser learned of the plan shortly before the war, he changed the plan.

At that briefing, President Nasser learned for the first time the specifics of KAHIR. For political reasons, President Nasser would not yield any territory to Israel. President Nasser ordered all Egyptian military forces out of their defensive positions and ordered Field Marshal Amer to advance all his forces forward to meet the Israelis at the border. Now, with President Nasser calling “an audible” at the line of scrimmage, Egyptian military leaders had no time to conduct route reconnaissance to their advanced attack positions, nor did they have time to select optimal battle positions.

Deception

The IAF wanted to attack from an area where the Egyptians were not expecting. This was achieved by a wave-top sweep in from over the Mediterranean Sea. By the time the AIF was detected, it was too late for the EAF to react.

The flights that left Israeli airfields on the morning of June 5th, began as they did every day, causing no undue concern for the Egyptians. While airborne in his IL-14 transport fitted out as an airborne command post, Egyptian Field Marshal Amer received ground observation reports that the skies over the Sinai were clear of all air traffic, except for the daily Israeli mission over the Mediterranean.

Egyptian Combat Air Patrol (CAP) missions were on station at dawn that morning, as they were every morning from 0400 until 0735. If an attack would come, the Egyptians reasoned, it would come at first light. Predictably, when the last Egyptian CAP had landed at 0745, Israeli jets were approaching, below Egyptian radar coverage, commencing their attack runs.

Additional deception was employed to the south, at Kuntilla, to reinforce an Egyptian expectation of an attack there, as had occurred in the 1956 war. The Israelis used Dummy tanks, fake radio traffic, and a small deception force to fool the Egyptians into thinking that is where the attack was going to originate. Additionally, the coast road to Rafah was a more formidable obstacle for the Israelis. Reinforced the Egyptian notion that the Israeli attack would come from Kuntilla. Instead, General Tal took his entire force to Rafah.

Fait Accompli
Fog and friction in war is to be expected, but for the Egyptians in June of 1967, it set in so quickly that the senior leadership was thrown into utter chaos. Field Marshal Amer’s lengthy morning flight, followed by difficulty obtaining ground transportation, brought him late to his command post. Upon arriving at his command post, he learned that his air force was severely damaged and news of the ground campaign was coming in piece-meal. Field Marshal Amer’s staff was having a difficult time trying to piece together an accurate picture of what was happening.

By the afternoon of June 5th, Field Marshal Amer was desperately trying to salvage the ground battle. He personally issued orders to Division and even Brigade commanders. Unfortunately, his barrage of orders was confusing, and at times, contradictory.

The following morning after receiving dire reports all evening, Field Marshal Amer ordered the withdrawal of all Egyptian forces back across the Suez Canal. That afternoon some members of his staff convinced him that his army was still largely intact and that the KAHIR Plan could still be salvaged. Field Marshal Amer now reversed his morning orders and ordered a new defensive line be established from Bir Gifgafa to Bir el-Thamada. Subordinate Commanders, however, could not comply; by then they were so confused, demoralized and headed in the wrong direction, Egyptian commanders could not turn their forces around. Many of the Sinai Field Army’s highest-ranking commanders had literally abandoned their units, and many mid-ranking officers followed their example.”

Epilogue
On June 9th Egyptian diplomats urged the UN to order Israel to cease fire and withdraw from Egyptian sovereign territory. On June 10th, after losing territory of their own, Egyptian diplomats were joined by Jordanian and Syrian diplomats urging the UN to order Israel to cease fire and withdraw from Arab sovereign territory On June 11, a U.N.-brokered cease-fire took effect and the Six-Day War was at an end.

The U.N. Security Council called for Israel to withdrawal from all the occupied regions. Israel declined, permanently annexing East Jerusalem and setting up military administrations in the occupied territories. Israel let it be known that Gaza, the West Bank, the Golan Heights were now Israeli territories. Israel further stipulated that the Sinai would be returned to Egypt in exchange for Arab recognition, of the right of Israel to exist and guarantees against future attacks.

Arab leaders, stinging from their defeat and loss of Arab territory, met in August to discuss the future of the Middle East. They decided on a policy of no peace, no negotiations, and no recognition of Israel. Further, Arab leaders made plans to zealously defend the rights of Palestinian Arabs in the occupied territories.

Israel had seized the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank of the Jordan River (including East Jerusalem), and the Golan Heights. Israel had more than doubled its land mass in the six days of fighting. Israel’s strategic depth grew to at least 300 kilometers in the south, 60 kilometers in the east, and 20 kilometers in the north.