TOS-UP Part III – Other Considerations

By Jim Naughton

PART III – (part 2 here) Now we’ll take a look at the complications – the effect of shifting targets, larger batteries, and Krasnopol. Refer to Battlefront’s source books World War III Soviet https://www.flamesofwar.com/hobby.aspx?art_id=7154 and World War III Warsaw Pact https://www.flamesofwar.com/hobby.aspx?art_id=7455 for details.

RANGING IN
The big weakness of artillery comes when your forces close in for the kill. ‘DANGER CLOSE’ makes you move the template, stop shooting or switch to smoke. PACT artillery suffers less than that of the Soviets. In fact, with an observer, it’s more likely to range in on the first attempt than the other two attempts combined.

There are only two things that affect ranging-in: a dedicated observer team and terrain under the template. The observer improves the range-in number and terrain degrades it, each by 1.
You can use a trick – firing a smoke barrage – to range in without penalty (pg. 56).  It delays the impact of the artillery but usually prevents the intended target from shooting in its next turn.

Thus Soviet artillery has three possible range-in numbers: 4+, 5+, and 6+.  PACT range-in numbers are 3+, 4+, and 5+.

Calculation of the probable effects of ranging-in is more complex than estimating the lethality. Luckily, it affects all artillery the same way. 

The likelihood of failing to range in is easy to calculate. It is simply the likelihood of failing three times.  In the typical (abysmal) case ranging in near terrain, the Soviets will fail 58% of the time. Lesson: have at least two batteries.

Ranging on any given die roll is NOT EQUAL probability. Why? You only use the 2nd if the 1st die roll fails, and the 3rd if the first two fail. So we need to use conditional probability rules to determine the probability of success on the second and third die roll. The general MATH statement of a conditional probability is P(2nd Success) = P(Failed 1st ) * P(success on one throw). This is the basis of the following table:

Table 6: Range-in Probabilities

The big lesson is that Soviet artillery needs their observer after the initial range-in markers become useless.  Or be used in mass so at least one battery can range in.  Frankly, in a fast-moving meeting engagement, I only expect smokescreens to matter.  And typically leave some artillery in reserve. 

You’ll notice that the likelihood of the 3^rd Attempt mattering is always less than half the combined probability of the first two attempts.  That means that if the Soviets succeed in ranging in, the chance of the whopping 2 number shift to the artillery’s To-Hit number is not high.   

How do the reduced To-Hit numbers affect lethality?  I’ll use the 6+ row in Table 6 and wave my hands a little to illustrate this, rather than calculating a lethality for each different attempt.  The probabilities per attempt are almost the same for the 6+ row, so the ‘Expected’ to-hit adjustment would be the second attempt at +1.

TABLE 7: BASIC LETHALITY INDEX – Ranging In – Soviet – +1 To-Hit

I’ll repeat this for PACT but assess them as ‘most likely’ ranging in on the first attempt as the probability for ranging in on the first attempt in the worst situation (no observer, terrain, 5+) is almost as big as the other two attempts combined.

TABLE 8: BASIC LETHALITY INDEX – Ranging In – PACT – +0 To-Hit

We now have to recall Table Three from Part II for comparison:

TABLE 3: BASIC LETHALITY INDEX

What we see here is the combined effect of losing the repeat bombardment benefit and having, on average, a worse To-Hit number.  TOS-1 now stands out versus infantry with a .18 because it has a Brutal bombardment.   As does DANA for PACT, thanks to the autoloader effect which carries over to vehicles.  The effect of that extra AP and the skill of PACT gunners shows up in looking at the BM-21, 2S1, and 2S3 rows in both Table 7 and Table 8.  

Does the ranging-in affect matter in the choice of artillery?  Somewhat.  To decide how much of a nudge to give it, you must answer the question ‘how many times in a game will I shift fires?’  In a friendly game, played to the bitter end, it might happen three times.  In a competition game, with time limits, it rarely happens twice. 

Sometimes, not even once. 

I expect to fire twice on my initial target and use smoke once, and the smokescreen can be used as a basis of shifting fires. Then fire twice more before the game is over.  TOS-1 can’t fire the smokescreen.  And thus has at least a 30% chance of failing to range in.  Averaging over 5 turns BLI of .20.  The BM-21, using smoke, gets four turns of BLI with repeat bombardments for an average of .11.  The Lethality per AP drops to .04 for TOS and .06 for BM-21, so the nudge isn’t enough to make TOS more attractive.   

But…the higher skill makes PACT artillery much more attractive despite the reduced ALI per AP.  Here DANA shines. 

However you arrange it, a Soviet battery usually loses one turn of shooting shifting fires.  A PACT battery typically does not, and hits harder on the turn it ranges in on the second target.  Over a five-turn game, a PACT battery will experience on average a 25 percent increase in lethality compared to the Soviet counterpart.  And the flexibility gained in using smoke and shifting fires is an intangible benefit.        

This leads up to our next topic, Super-sizing batteries.

SUPER-SIZE DOES NOT EQUAL EXTRA CRISPY

A battery firing a template with 5 or 6 artillery teams gets to reroll failures.  That seems a substantial benefit and indeed I tried it early on with my 2S1s.  When they repeatedly failed to satisfy, I sat back and looked at the MATH and discovered the fallacy in my thinking.  2×3 is greater than 1 x 6.  

Why?  It has to do with the range-in tables above.  If using a pre-battle ranged-in marker, or luckily rolling success on first attempt, my to-hit number versus NATO is 4+.  Half my dice should be hits, so my reroll benefit is +50%.  I paid +100% to get this benefit.  Ouch!

In fact, the only time that my barrage gets +100% benefit is if I fail the first two attempts to range in.  If my range-in number was 6+, that’s 12% of the time.  5+, 15%.  So I get full benefit at best 15% of the time.  The average benefit for Soviet artillery is approximately +67 percent and for PACT artillery +60 percent.         

If I fire two Soviet batteries at the same target under worst-case conditions, say 2S1s, at least one of the batteries ranges in 67% of the time, so I increase the chance to get some steel on target.  In fact, both batteries will range in 17% of the time.  With a 6-pack, it’s all or nothing.  Nothing comes up 58% of the time.  Firing two 3-packs of 2S1s at the same target generates a BLI of .36 while the 6-pack only generates .27. 

To be sure, there are tangible benefits to a 6-pack.  Firing without the template, you get one shot per tube.  100% more shots for 100% more points.  But that only affects the howitzers; the SALVO template weapons are stuck with a 60%-67% lethality benefit for the extra points. 

Increased survivability has some utility, particularly in a counterbattery fight or if NATO attack helicopters are ignoring your tanks.  

And unique capabilities may be strong enough to argue for doubling the weapons which are only available in one slot.  E.g. TOS-1 or BM-27.  If considering that route, note what lethality the extra points will buy in another artillery system.  For example, a 6-pack of TOS-1 under optimum conditions against infantry has a BLI of .83.  A 3-pack of TOS-1 plus the two 3-packs of 2S1 that you could buy with the extra 10 AP generates a combined BLI of .55 + 2 x .18 = .91.  And gives you two smokescreens.  

With PACT weapons, the likelihood of hitting on the 3^rd Range-in-attempt is so small compared to other possibilities that the benefit is always less than the cost bump.  Two PACT 2S1s are always better than a single large battery, and a 6-pack of DANAs is less lethal than a 3-pack of 2S1s and a 3-pack of DANAs.   

JUST SAY ‘NO’ TO KRAS­NOPOL

When Red Thunder was published, I quickly acquired my 2S3s and excitedly experimented with Krasnopol.  This made the battery cost 7 points.  In three games, tricky NATO players obliterated my Observer on GT1.  I got a total of 9 shots off and scored precisely one hit.  My NATO opponent in that game rolled a ‘6’ for his top armor save.  He only needed a ‘3’.  Copperheads these aren’t, thinks I. 

I haven’t paid the extra points since.   Setting aside the obvious problem with keeping an observer safe while simultaneously using him, MATH says this isn’t cost-effective. 

First, the Artillery Unit must be eligible to fire a bombardment.  In meeting engagements, the first mover’s artillery is ineligible.  So despite this attack working much the same way as a direct fire, it’s not available.  In a meeting engagement, the opponent always gets one crack at the observer.  You can’t even protect him with a smokescreen!

Say your observer survives to call a shot.  Or you have the first turn.  Three Krasnopol fly down range.  If the target was a NATO MBT that fired, the BLI is .17.  If concealed and gone to ground, .09.

Fire a bombardment.  Assume three tanks under the template.  We have an observer, or we couldn’t fire the Krasnopol.  Use the BLI-RI table.  Cumulative BL = 3 x .05 =.15.  

I paid 40 percent extra to get a .02 increase in BLI, or a 13 percent increase in lethality.  Typically, for one turn.  If 4 or more tanks are under the template, or if a mix of targets, or if gone to ground, straight bombardment is better.  Only if sniping one isolated tank does Krasnopol shine.

And after GT 1, usually, the points are wasted.

Perversely, using Krasnopol in a six-pack is better, because the six-pack bombardment isn’t as effective as two three-packs, and a second battery of 2S3s is not an option.   The Krasnopols now give a cumulative BLI of .34.  The bombardment yields .25.  For one turn the Krasnopols reign supreme.  Then reality intrudes.

So if you are determined to use Krasnopol, ignore my earlier advice and buy a 6-pack of 2S3.

For my part, I just say NO to KrasNOpol. 

My Technique

I play an aggressive game tailoring my artillery accordingly.  15% AP invested in artillery seems right.  At 60 AP or less, that used to be a 2S1 and an observer.  Now it’s a BM-21, and sometimes an observer, and/or sometimes a 2S1.  The 2S1 remains prime for me because I can always use it as an assault gun (however briefly). 

Next up has been 2S3, although I’m now considering BM-27 replacing the BM-21 instead of taking the extra unit.  That takes me through the hundred-point level.  TOS-1 is attractive, but so are two batteries of 2S1, 2S1 plus 2S3, or BM-27 for the same points (or less).  The single minefield I can get with three BM-27s is an attractive gimmick. 

     

PACT choices are more limited and very much determined by nationality (East Germany couldn’t afford DANAs so they are not an option).  The extra skill bump is very useful, and if you play Poles or Czechs, the DANA is definitely worth having (in a 3-pack!). 

When you blend allied forces, you’re essentially choosing between DANA and TOS/BM-27.  BM-27 wins IMHO because it triples the area denied by the template, throws smoke and the price is essentially the same as DANA.  TOS is too much of a one-trick pony for competitive games but has a niche when forced to attack UK infantry.  But don’t forget your PACT Ally 2S1s!

Wrap-Up

Like most things in gaming, there is no definitive answer.  I presented the lethality of the various Soviet/PACT weapons, assessed their lethality per AP after ‘normalizing’ for template size, explained why two batteries outperform one big battery, and examined Krasnopol.  When you choose 2S1 for direct fire potential over 2S3, you know how much lethality you are losing. 

But no simple way assesses the compensating value of blasting marauding Bradleys or taking out an Abrams in a meeting engagement.  Style of play will dominate those decisions.  Referring to the above tables will help make it an informed decision. 

All in all, it’s a TOS-UP.