Team Yankee

 

When Battlefront published WORLD WAR III TEAM YANKEE SOVIETS https://www.flamesofwar.com/hobby.aspx?art_id=7154 four years ago, they introduced Soviet units with NATO capabilities – the Shock T80 company.  The backstory was that one of the regiments of 4^th Guards Tank Division was permitted to experiment with Western-style tactics.  The regiment created a special ‘shock’ battalion pairing shock tank companies with shock motor rifle companies.

Some consider the story inflated or perhaps fantasy.  The truth is the Soviets had units that trained beyond the NORMs for motor rifle and tank formations and some that mimicked NATO tactics.  The problem is that they weren’t equipped with T80s or BMP-3s.

This is their story, and PART II will be discussion of how to represent these units in casual gaming.

Independent Regiments for Border Screening

Soviet troops patrolled the Inner German Border (IGB) from 1946.  When the East Germans established their own military, they quickly established their own border troops – the Grenztruppen.  These were lightly armed paramilitary police units.  While effective at patrolling the border, they offered no security against a NATO attempt to forcibly reunify Germany.  The Soviets backed these troops up with tank battalions augmented with their own infantry.  These were called border screening troops, and distinct from KGB units.  Their purpose was to protect the Soviet (and later Volksarmee) units deploying from garrison.

After Khrushchev ended the Soviet heavy tank family, STAVKA had the problem of repurposing heavy tank organizations.  Many retained their original identities, even as they were re-equipped with Standard Tanks (the Soviet name for what the West called Main Battle Tanks or MBT).  However several became parent HQ for collections of border screening units.

Some heavy tank battalions were fed into the screening organizations or used to give independent tank battalions to motor rifle divisions in the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG), Central Group of Forces (CGF) and others. By 1980 this process was complete, leaving GSFG with seven Independent Tank regiments for Border Screening.  5^th Independent Tank Brigade’s conversion into the 138^th Independent Tank Regiment ended the process.

These new regiments initially retained their old tanks until fielding of the T64 made T62s available.  When T62s were withdrawn, they were re-equipped with T64As upgraded in East German workshops to T64B armor standards.  According to ex-Soviet tankers corresponding on TANKNET, the T64s were in place by 1983.

These units’ peacetime function was providing collective training for other Soviet units in their area.  They were encouraged to adopt Western style tactics, so that the beneficiaries of their attention became familiar with how NATO forces would respond.  While not as sophisticated as the National Training Center experience, it was different than the typical Soviet exercise.

The incidental effect was these units were better trained than the typical Soviet unit, and able to copy NATO tactics.  Put differently, they were virtually a match for BF’s description of ‘shock’ units.

In wartime, the role of the border screening regiments mirrored NATO’s covering forces with one significant difference – in short notice scenarios these regiments were expected to roar across the border and screen it from 20-30 kilometers deep in NATO territory, preventing NATO artillery from shelling border crossing points.

The organization differed from the standard tank regiment.  Each battalion had FOUR companies with a total of 41 tanks each, giving the regiment 124 tanks.  The regiment had a full BMP battalion with 45 BMPs (BMP-1P after 1983).  Some sources claim the reconnaissance company had an extra tracked recon platoon.  One oddity was the absence of an artillery battalion.

To keep Western intelligence guessing about the wartime purpose of these units, the artillery battalions stationed separately and the TANKNET correspondents claimed they would be augmented by 2S3 Acacia battalions (Coincidentally, seven Soviet divisions in GSFG had an extra 2S3 battalion).

A New (Old) System of Maneuver

In the late 1970s Soviet military thinking focused on two concepts designed to break up NATOs evolving Forward Defense/Active Defense strategy.  At the tactical level the concept was called Forward Detachments (FD) and at the operational (Army and Front) the method was the Operational Maneuver Group (OMG).

These techniques had been the cornerstone of Soviet success in WWII.  However, as the Soviet Army mechanized, the techniques seemed less relevant.  Both techniques exploited the speed differential between motorized units and the largely foot-mobile and horse-drawn formations fighting on the Eastern Front.

Soviet military theorists reconsidered the relevance when NATO moved from MASSIVE RETALIATION to FLEXIBLE RESPONSE in the mid-60s.  NATO’s operational level implementation was Forward Defense – essentially lining the IGB with conventional forces using fixed defenses punctuated with large reserves to contain a Soviet breakthrough.

This system’s weakness was displayed during the Yom Kippur War in 1973.  Both the Syrians and Egyptians broke through Israeli fixed defenses.  The Israelis ‘won’ the war suffering heavy losses.  The USA observed the war and concluded Forward Defense would fail.  They began moving to a different operational method – Active Defense.

Active Defense visualized the Soviet breakthrough being ‘swarmed’ by thinning the Main Line of Resistance (MLR) to commit local reserves in small packets.  Soviet strategists saw opportunities in the Active Defense technique.  This raised potential for smaller Soviet forces to penetrate the remaining cordon on the MLR, as well as counter elements of the ‘swarm.’  This was the job of FDs.

The other opportunity was penetration in operational depth – i.e. to the NATO corps rear boundary – of a large, combined arms force while the main breakthrough was contending with the ‘swarm.’  This penetration would disrupt NATO logistics over a wide area and be too big for the remaining local reserves.  This was the mission of the OMG.

FDs were combined arms units created at the division and regiment level as opportunities arose.  Ideally, the units had teamed together in training.  An OMG had to be preplanned.  Training exercises in the mid-70s showed that ad hoc ‘Corps’ comprising two divisions had the combat power necessary for the mission, but the long logistics tail of the corps and the ad hoc nature of the arrangement reduced efficiency.  Also the bigger the OMG, the longer the response time.

Ultimately the Soviets created specialized units to perform as OMGs at the TVD level, but at Front/Army levels repurposed existing formations to improve response time.  This gave new life to independent tank regiments and independent tank brigades.

I’ve already discussed the border screening regiments of GSFG.  Once their screening mission was complete, they assumed the role of normal independent tank regiments – a quick response OMG for their army.  Each GSFG army had at least one.

Frontal Tank Brigades had disappeared from the GSFG by 1980, but the resources remained.

Hiding In Plain Sight – Tank Training Centers

By 1980 GSFG had consolidated most of its tank training units into two tank training centers operated by the 41^st and 101^st Tank Training Regiments.  These were large organizations, providing both individual and collective training to GSFG units.

They each had several battalion sets of tanks, although most were T55s – cheaper to operate.  They also had advanced tanks for familiarization and transition training.

With hostilities imminent, they would close.  Western intelligence theorized that they could become the missing Frontal Tank Brigades, operating a mix of advanced (T80 or T64) tanks and T55s.

The Tank Brigade TOE (Table of Organization and Equipment) was like the tank regiment, with tank battalions having five companies instead of four, for a total of 154 tanks.  Both tank training centers easily met this threshold, and 101^st Regiment had two training areas and could easily have fielded a fourth tank battalion.    These centers had a mix of self-propelled artillery, likely fielding a mixed battalion.  Again BMPs would provide the transport, although the riflemen would come from reserve units activating in the USSR.

While T55s seem odd in this role, remember the OMG’s purpose was a quick penetration of the NATO MLR and exploitation into the logistics areas.  The T55 was easily a match for the equally old M48s that populated the West German Heimatschutzkommando brigades charged with Rear Area Combat Operations (RACO).  Any tank – including the airborne ASU-85 – was deadly to the logistics units targeted by the OMG.  And T55 fuel requirements were significantly lower than T64 or T80.

These units would have a high proportion of experienced praporschik (warrant officers) to command platoons thus being better able to operate independently.  If the GSFG transitioned to war maintaining this proportion, these units could also qualify as ‘elite.’

Combined (Unified) Army Corps

In 1980 the Soviets began experimenting with a new formation, variously called the Combined or Unified Army Corps.  This was a revival of the Soviet mechanized corps of World War II, not a Corps in either the Western sense or the Soviet usage (Soviet corps of the late Cold War were multidivisional territorial commands directly subordinate to a military district, and usually found protecting the external borders.  They lacked most of the support services normally found in a combined arms army).

Three divisions initially participated in this experiment – the 24^th (Iron) Motor Rifle Division (MRD) at Lvov, the 120^th (Rogachev Guards) Guards MRD at Minsk, and the 5^th Guards (Don-Budapest) Tank Division (TKD) at Kyakhta.

In 1982 STAVKA authorized the 120^th Guards MRD and the 5^th Guards TKD to proceed with the next phase of the experiment.  The 24^th MRD was frozen.  Western intelligence theorized that this was because the Soviets couldn’t afford the attack helicopter and air assault regiments demanded by the new TOE.

120^th Guards MRD now became the 5^th Combined Army Corps (CAC).  5^th Guards TKD became the 48^th Guards CAC.  The organization developed through 1983.  The CIA reported that the new organization was four brigades of five battalions each.  Figure 3 shows the Corps organization around 1985.

The brigades had an organic BM-21 rocket artillery battalion, doubled the size of their air defense company and later added a battery of eight SA-8 Geckos changing the ADA unit into a battalion.  The Corps air defense regiment eventually had five batteries of SA-11 Gadfly.  The Corps had a BM-27 battalion in addition to ‘divisional’ BM-21s.  The Artillery Regiment expanded to three 2S3 Acacia battalions.

The other unusual feature of these units was the Combined Arms Battalion (CAB).  There were at least two in each brigade.  Originally, two tank and one motor rifle battalion completed a Tank Brigade, and the companion Mechanized Brigade added one tank and two motor rifle battalions.

Both Corps had organic air assault capabilities, with a Landing Assault Regiment (including a BMD battalion) and an Independent Assault Helicopter Regiment.

The number of CABs and subunit organization varied between the two Corps and from year to year.  The baseline CAB appears to have been two tank companies and two motor rifle companies, but at times there were as many as five companies with Tank CAB having 3 tank companies plus 2 motor rifle companies and Mechanized CAB having the reverse.

The baseline organization would have 462 tanks and up to 566 BMPs, 45 BMDs, 72 2S1, 54 2S3, 90 BM21s, 18 BM-27s, 32+ ZSU-23 or Tunguska, 32+ SA-13, 32 SA-8, and 20 SA-11.  As the organization fluctuated, the tank strength approached 500 tanks.

One feature of this experiment was NATO-style task forces combining tanks and BMPs on a habitual basis, to the extent of putting them in the same motor pool.  Training exceeded the norms for the regular forces.

Initially the 5^th CAC fielded T72s and the 48^th CACs fielded T62s. As experimental units they had first call on newer equipment (T72B and T62M) and trained intensively.

The Soviets started the experiment with other units (notably 32^nd Guards TKD and 90^th Guards TKD) but they did not get as far as 24^th MRD.

Next article will cover the ways to represent these units in Team Yankee.

 

 

By Jim Naughton

When I originally contemplated writing this article, data points were hard to find.  But BF’s expansion of the game has added additional data beyond the original unit in WWIII TY Soviets.

In RED DAWN  we find  ‘VDV’ and ‘VDV Afghantsy’ units, the first being a battalion with improved skills and assault ratings and the second being veteran paratroopers with NATO-like ratings.

From NORDIC FORCES  we find Finnish troops using (mostly) Soviet gear with ratings like the VDV Afghantsy companies.

MIA – PACT Airborne Forces

When Battlefront published RED DAWN and the Airborne Assault Missions Pack 18 months ago, I found one casual comment disturbing.  Page 46 says “WARSAW PACT armies (Czechoslovakian, East German, and Polish) lacked dedicated airborne infantry (as opposed to airborne raiding troops) …”

This is a distinction without a difference, and a dismissal.  I intend to correct the record and give some ideas how these MIA units can be incorporated into the game in casual play.

I’m going to follow the sequence in WARSAW PACT in this discussion but start with a unit found in all PACT armies.

Battlefront has decided to bring dynamic points to Team Yankee. It’s an exciting prospect to adjust the points of various units which will certainly adjust how people build lists. The first set of changes have landed in https:forces.team-yankee.com allowing everyone to more easier build test lists.

Thus far the modifications include making anti-aircraft units more expensive and tanks less expensive. Battlefront has been clear, their initial changes are a start not a final word, as the game is a living game. They next time they’ll revisit is approximately in the November 2024 timeframe.

Getting back to basics, what is the goal?

Team Yankee is a point costed system where you can show up at the table to play against someone where your units and all their capabilities will have some areas where you are strong, others where you might be weak due to the choices you’ve made putting together a list. Dynamic points allow the designers to revisit those point costs after the fact tuning to in hopes to adjust the balance.

Long time players know and see that there are certain combos and list elements that over or under perform.  Adjusting points can help the things that under perform, enticing players to make use of them, get them off that dusty shelf, and those units that over perform, make them a little more expensive so while you might still take the unit, you’ll have to make sacrifices elsewhere.

What’s changed?

The dynamic points changes that have landed make main battle tanks (MBTs) cheaper. This should entice players to field a few more than what they have done in the past. Leo2’s, T-80s, M1A1s etc. will probably be on the table more often. Well, maybe.

Anti-aircraft is more expensive. You’ll feel the pain to mitigate those higher point games where you just know people will be bringing air assets. Anti-aircraft units often had another purpose though and that is to go over low armor APCs and such. The West German Gepards, British Chieftain Marksmen, Russian Tunguska, and so on all work well in that capacity. While more expensive I doubt raising the points a bit with change these often auto-include units.

Current challenges in the game

Let’s spend a few moments and think about problem areas in the game that dynamic points didn’t touch. What detracts from the game or causes frustration with players. This is my list.

• Missiles are everywhere. From APCs, man packed, helicopters, tank fired and more it’s a wide range of AT with one focus, knocking out other vehicles. Anti tank assets are everywhere.
• APCs are more prevalent and as the game stands they are allowed to function far and away from the unit to which they are attached. This causes them to be used in ways uncharacteristic of APCs, whose purpose is to support and carry the unit they are assigned.
• Strike Aircraft/Anti-aircraft struggles, on the one hand harriers are the terror of the table with their 3+ arrival and very effective munitions load out with high AT. The remaining strike aircraft somewhat suffer with a 4+ arrival and some nations aircraft are easier to hit with worse saves.

Points won’t fix these kinds of challenges. Should we consider what could help the game? These are thoughts offered up for consideration with the goal of improving the game.

Missiles

Team Yankee, depending on your list can be one large missile fest. For some units that makes perfect sense, take the Soviet Storms, they should have plenty of missiles on hand as that is why they exist.  The Soviet BMP-1 also carries missiles, but it’s not a tank hunter, it’s an APC. Its standard load out is only 4 AT-3 Sagger missiles. Yet in Team Yankee, BMP swarm lists are a “thing” because salvo after salvo of BMP missiles can handle many a tank or APC.

BMPs are not alone in limited missile load outs. Consider man-packed Milan missiles. There would only be so many carried and if infantry is out on the march, without their APCs nearby, the infantry teams could only carry so many.

I think the solution isn’t in a points adjustment, but rather the adjustment of game mechanics. Some might be quick to suggest ammo load outs. Certainly other rule systems like PSC’s Battlegroup NorthAG/CentAG do just this, but it’s also a pain to track ammo for a game you want to get done in a few hours.

How about an ammo check instead?  After missile shooting by a Tank attachment or missile team with a heavy weapon designation, that a 3+ be rolled or the unit is “out of ammo” when it comes to missiles.

APCs

A substantial difference between Team Yankee and Flames of War is support units are able to act independently of the team they support. Consider the French 120mm man packed mortar unit, which comes wither either 3 or 6 VAB transports. These armored transports can go running around the table doing anything they like. I personally like to use them to try and hunt down infantry on the move.

Transports have an offensive responsibility, consider the Bradley or BMP-1, BMP-2, Marder 2 which all carry infantry forward.  Roaming out far and wide alone on the table top?  It’s a common tactic with NATO and WARPAC players. It casts them into being used as battlefield chaff (when empty), annoying to deal with it and it leads to spam lists.

What if transport attachments went back to having to stay with in a certain distance of teams they support? Perhaps 6″, 8″ even 12″ could still be representational of their role in modern times. This wouldn’t tie them down, rather if they are carrying even a subset of the infantry they support, that would be more in keeping with how they are used.

So the thought is, unlike Flames of War, don’t require that transport attachments need to be within command distance of the infantry platoon/company commander, rather require that they have to be within 6″-8″ of infantry teams that they support.

Strike Aircraft

Aircraft present an interesting challenge in Team Yankee. Soviet SU-17 Fitter strike aircraft with their 5+ skill, 3+ to hit and 5+ save, 8 points for 6 planes are generally not worth the points and thus don’t see the table top often.  Where as British Harriers with a 3+ skill, 4+ to hit, and 5+ save that appear on a 3+ instead of the usual 4+ are very often worth the points due to their BL-755 Cluster Bombs that use a Salvo template with a crazy good 8 Anti-Tank and 3+ fire power, 4 planes for 10 points.

There is a wide range of capability yet the point difference is only 2.  Yet if we look at the Finns who have access to 4 Viggens for 16 points, skill 3+, hit on 4+, 5+ save with a one shot salvo with a 5 anti-tank and 3+ fire power, quite a point increase for lesser capabilities.

Comparisons of points across nationalities is perhaps also the wrong way of looking at it, as point values can represent access to hardware, tactical doctrines and more.

In the case of strike aircraft I think there is a case to be made for a point cost for availability. The flames of war v3 system of purchasing 3 dice, 5 dice, or 7 dice, to determine aircraft availability immediately comes to mind. If there was any 5s in the mix, your aircraft were available. If you wanted to have a fighter intercept you’d roll your dice  and look for a 6 in the results and if so, the enemy planes were intercepted and not available after all. However after every roll you made no matter the reason, you’d lose one dice from the pool, but you’d always at a minimum roll at least 1 die for availability or intercept.

What if you pay in points for a number of dice for aircraft intercept and strike aircraft support?  Consider 10 points for 7 dice availability of  6 Soviet SU-17 fitters, 5 dice availability for 6 points, and 3 dice for 4 points. What could be reasonable point values for other nations strike aircraft?

I would assert this was a better system for determining aircraft availability. Paying points for more reliability and capability is a better approach.

Wrap up

Dynamic points for Team Yankee has potential to stir up list building by giving players lower cost tank options. The months ahead as tournaments and casual gaming occur, should see some interesting after action reports. I’m not expecting much, especially due to the “missile fest” challenge I brought up within this article. With all the AT out there, cheaper tanks are still easy targets.

In the Minneapolis / St Paul area where I game, our next tournament is tank themes so while we’re using dynamic points, list building rules won’t be normal. Fall in, Autumn Wars and other events will probably be a better guide presuming they use dynamic points.

Time will tell if Battlefront will consider adjusting other elements of the game to address problems instead of just via points adjustments.

 

 

By Tom Gall

Gencon sold out this year for all 4 days, 70,000 gamers which makes for a very busy downtown Indianapolis Indiana. I went for Able Kompanie’s Flames of War and Team Yankee tournaments that they ran Thursday-Saturday.  This is a tale of some of my adventures.

First a few shots from around the con before I cover the tournaments.

Opinion Piece By Jim Naughton

DYNAMIC POINTS: IF ENOUGH CUSTOMERS WHINE, THEY’RE RIGHT

A recent FACEBOOK post called attention to a BF plan to introduce DYNAMIC POINTS into Team Yankee.  It referred the reader to the Team Yankee website.  Since then, there has been a lot discussion in the various TY Groups on social medium.  

Couple years back, dynamic points were invented for Flames of War. The ostensible ‘reason’ for this was FOW tournament players had reacted to the Army Point (AP) values of the bread-and-butter tanks of MIDWAR by choosing Lend-Lease Tanks for the Soviets and spamming armored cars. Armored cars worked because they had enough armor and lots of machine guns to tank-assault many infantry units. Lend-Lease tanks like the M3 medium had an extra shot compared to T34s.

By Morten

In this article I will talk about markings used on Danish Vehicles in the 80s and 90s.
Most of these have been in use since the 60/70s and are still in use to this day, although with some variations and updates.

For some markings there are Army standards that needs to be obeyed, and are generally placed on the same location on all vehicles, although slight variation in placement could occur, because they were put on the vehicle by either the crew themselves or the mechanic echelons on base.

Let’s start with the “easy” parts that are present on all vehicles: License plates, Vehicle numbers and weight classification (for heavier vehicles).

By Morten A.

Before Battlefront decided to include Denmark in Team Yankee with the Nordic Forces book, I was fiddling around modifying the West Germans into the Danish army, by modifying the BF models to resemble units that were available to Denmark during the 1985-1995 timeline that BF is using for TY.

After the release of Nordic Forces, I continued modifying models and adding some 3D printed ones to either better represent the models in the Danish army or proxy units BF did not include in their list.

By Morten 

In Morten’s previous article he showed us how to paint Team Yankee Danish infantry. Now he will show us how to paint their vehicles.

In 1980, the Danish Army decided to paint all their operational vehicles in a two-tone camouflage pattern. Prior to this, all the vehicles was just painted green.

By Morten

The Danish army got a new camo pattern for their uniforms, designated M/84 in 1984, to replace the older M/58 uniform. Although it was implemented into the Army in 84’ it didn’t reach the troops until years later. Even in the 90’s some troops had still not received the new uniform and especially reservists would still be issued the older M/58 uniform. 

The webbing used was of British making and had been donated to Denmark by the UK, after the Second World War. Denmark did not replace this webbing, until start to mid 90’s, although some bags and pouches on the webbing would be replaced with newer versions along the way (like new ammo pouches for the M/75(G3) rifle). Most of the webbing would be a tan/khaki color, although color variations did occur, and could range from a light green to dark khaki. 

Here is my take on how to paint a Danish Panserinfantri Deling (PNINF DEL), or Armored Infantry Platoon, for Team Yankee, in the M/84 uniform.